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Many assume that the emotions of shame and 
guilt are neatly distinct. Shame allegedly occurs, 
somehow superficially, when one’s reputation is 
undermined: it is a self-centred emotion that re-
sponds to external norms and sanctions. Guilt, on 
the other hand, entails a sense of personal respon-
sibility and relates exclusively to the conscience of 
the individual; thus, as opposed to shame, guilt 
features distinctively moral traits. 
Per una teoria della vergogna sets off with a 
discussion of the traditional distinction between 
shame and guilt, building on Bernard Williams’ 
defence of shame as developed in Shame and Ne-
cessity (see B. WILLIAMS, Shame and Necessity, 
Berkeley 1993). One of Williams’ major aims is to 
criticise accounts, such as those of Bruno Snell 
and Arthur Adkins, which undervalue the com-
plexity of ancient Greek social interactions and 
moral responses by endorsing a view that sharply 
distinguishes between shame and guilt. This dis-
tinction originates from the assumption that 
shame is only concerned with external sanctions 
and, as a consequence, is essentially non-moral. 
Such an assumption is at work in the 
shame/culture versus guilt/culture antithesis, 
whose classical formulation is to be found in Ruth 
Benedict’s The Chrysanthemum and the Sword (R. 
BENEDICT, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: 
Patterns of Japanese Culture, Houghton Mifflin, 
Boston/New York 1946; an earlier statement of 
the difference between external and internal sanc-
tions appeared in M. MEAD (ed.), Cooperation and 
Competition Among Primitive Peoples, 
McGrow/Hill, New York 1937, especially pp. 
493-495) and which was first applied to classical 
Greece by Eric Dodds (E. DODDS, The Greeks and 
the Irrational, California University Press, Berke-
ley 1951). By questioning the traditional interpre-
tative framework, Williams revitalises ancient 
Greek views and draws on them to provide a bet-
ter understanding of contemporary emotional 
experience, rehabilitating shame and challenging 
the centrality of guilt in our ethical life. 
In her book, Fussi explores the theoretical im-
plications of Williams’ defence of shame. She il-
lustrates a fourfold accusation often levelled at 
shame: that it is a selfish, superficial, and heter-
onomous emotion that, by entailing an objective 
attitude (that is, the loss of one’s authority to 
make claims on one another), precludes one from 
taking an inter-personal standpoint (what Ste-
phen Darwall calls a “second-personal” stand-
point: Fussi refers to Darwall’s account of Straw-
son’s distinction between reactive and objective 
attitudes and of the relation between reactive atti-
tudes and accountability; cf. P.F. STRAWSON, 
Freedom and Resentment, in: «Proceedings of the 
British Academy», vol. XLVIII, 1968, pp. 1-25; S. 
DARWALL, Essays in Second-Personal Ethics, Vol. I 
and II, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2013). As 
far as heteronomy is concerned, Fussi argues in 
favour of a view that blurs the boundaries be-
tween shame and guilt: at least in some circum-
stances, shame puts emphasis on personal respon-
sibility as much as guilt does, while shame’s al-
leged requirement of an “external audience” is as 
well met by the agent’s internalised moral stand-
ards as it is by his or her own self-judgment. The 
last section of CHAPTER 1 deals with the nature of 
the ethical sensitivity that one has internalised 
(what Williams calls the “internalised other”) and 
with one’s desire to be respected by those whom 
one respects or admires. By touching on the rela-
tion between shame and power, Fussi’s conclud-
ing remarks open, at least implicitly, to key issues 
in recognition theory both on a psychological and 
on a normative level. 
The elusiveness of a distinction between 
shame and guilt is further discussed in CHAPTER 
2, which offers an exploration of Aristotle’s analy-
sis of aidōs and aischynē in the Rhetoric and in the 
ethical treatises. The author illustrates the rea-
sons why aidōs is denied the status of virtue (are-
tē) and expands on the relation between aidōs and 
aischynē as two aspects of a single emotion con-
cept with different temporal orientations. The 
main claim put forward in this chapter is that, 
from an Aristotelian perspective, shame includes 
guilt, but occurs in a broader spectrum of circum-
stances. As a matter of fact, not only does shame 
occur when one regrets his or her own immoral 
conduct, but also as a response to circumstances 
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for which one is not personally responsible, for 
instance when one is denied equal status by his or 
her peers or, more generally, when he or she is a 
victim of injustice and humiliation. In this re-
spect, the crucial issue arises whether any sharp 
distinction should be made between one’s con-
cerns for one’s own moral conduct (guilt-
scenarios) and one’s focus on his or her own self-
image (shame-scenarios). Such a distinction ex-
plains a number of phenomenal differences be-
tween guilt and shame: such as, why personal re-
sponsibility is required for the former but not for 
the latter or why guilt, but not shame, calls for re-
payment. Still, as Fussi seems inclined to 
acknowledge, the definition of shame as an emo-
tion concerned with one’s ideal of the person he 
or she would like to be and that of guilt as con-
cerned with one’s own actions and conduct entails 
a somewhat artificial variance of focus: the evalu-
ation of one’s own conduct is a constitutive part 
of one’s self-image and, conversely, one’s self-
image integrates substantial references to oneself 
as an agent. 
Going further along these lines, CHAPTER 3 
starts with a discussion of Gabriele Taylor’s dis-
tinction between shame as an emotion that focus-
es on the whole self and is concerned with self-
respect, and guilt as an emotion concerned with 
the self as an agent who is responsible for his or 
her acts or omissions. The examination of the 
idea that shame determines a loss of self-respect 
rather than of self-esteem is supported by an ex-
ploration of the former in terms of the danger of 
feeling excluded from social categories to which 
one would like to belong and which play an im-
portant role as markers of one’s identity. One ex-
ample that the author elaborates on is that of an 
athlete who has a high opinion of his abilities and 
is defeated in a competition: he loses some self-
esteem, but does not lose self-respect insofar as he 
believes his performance was good enough to 
meet the standards required for being an athlete. 
Loss of self-respect and a feeling of shame result 
from events that cause us to doubt our legitimate 
belonging to a group we would like to be part of 
by showing that the grounds for our belief that we 
are, say, excellent athletes, good scholars or hon-
est people are in fact shaky. Discussing how we 
determine whether a failure is so severe as to 
make us lose our self-respect, Fussi describes the 
dangers of both solipsistic and other-directed be-
haviours and emphasises the importance of bal-
ancing a third-person perspective with our own 
worldview. Building on this, she examines the ra-
tionality of shame and its relation to autonomy 
and heteronomy by emphasising the importance 
of being able to think from the standpoint of eve-
ryone else, illustrating this capacity with reference 
to Arendt’s notion of “enlarged mentality”. The 
second half of the chapter is dedicated to a cri-
tique of Deonna, Rodogno, and Teroni’s account 
of shame (see In Defence of Shame, Oxford Uni-
versity Press, Oxford 2011) and to the following 
issues in particular: when one is incapable of liv-
ing up to the demands entailed by a self-relevant 
value, is perceiving oneself as being below a min-
imum acceptance threshold sufficient for one to 
feel ashamed? Or is it necessary that one appre-
hends a trait of his or hers as exemplifying the po-
lar opposite of a self-relevant value? How should 
we pin down the difference between shame and 
self-disappointment? Does the reflexive stance on 
oneself that shame involves necessarily entail the 
adoption of someone else’s perspective? 
This last question sheds light on a crucial 
theme in moral psychology: could we ever know 
ourselves independently of others? Doesn’t per-
sonal identity fundamentally depend on the feed-
back we get from other subjects? CHAPTER 4 deals 
with the ethical and political implications of the 
relation between recognition and identity for-
mation by focusing on the emotion that Aristotle 
called aidōs (“pudore” in Italian; in English trans-
lations “modesty” can be used, but the meanings 
of the two terms do not precisely overlap). Based 
on phenomenological observations, Fussi remarks 
that shame makes one feel powerless and insignif-
icant, but it can also make one feel the need to 
hide or disappear. She interprets this as an at-
tempt at self-defence against misrecognition, that 
is, the distortion of one’s relation to one’s self that 
results from the discrepancy between what one is 
or wants to be and the way others look at one. 
Such an approach interestingly contributes to our 
understanding of the experience of causeless 
shame, that is, when we have nothing to be 
ashamed of and yet we feel ashamed. This emo-
tion is well known to minorities and members of 
disesteemed groups: what goes on here is that we 
suffer from being prevented from displaying our 
own self-representations in an autonomous way, 
typically because of a demeaning picture of our-
selves that is imposed on us by the dominant cul-
ture or group or by a powerful individual with 
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whom we are engaged in an asymmetrical rela-
tionship. Fussi’s investigation of shame and mod-
esty from the vantage point of the interaction be-
tween the private and the public sphere helps us 
greatly to understand this phenomenon and of-
fers compelling remarks on the dynamics of 
shame and power.  
Insightfully integrating historical reflections 
with theoretical analysis, Per una teoria della ver-
gogna is worth reading for anybody interested in 
the psychology of shame and in the ethics of an 
emotion that, properly understood, can play a 
positive role in our lives. 
 
Pia Campeggiani 
 
 
